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INTRODUCTION 
Two women meet, fall in love, and decide to start a family. Perhaps 
one partner is artificially inseminated and is both the genetic and gestational 
mother of the child. Or, perhaps one partner donates her eggs and is the 
genetic mother while the other partner is the gestational and birth mother. 
Who is a legal mother in these scenarios? May both women establish legal 
parentage or can there be only one mother? With increasing frequency, 
courts are being asked to determine the parental rights of lesbian partners; 
some of these partners have no biological connection to their child(ren), 
while others have donated genetic material. I Existing parentage laws, 
predicated on a one mother/one father paradigm, are often inadequate to 
resolve these disputes.2 The law has not yet caught up with the realities of 
reproductive technology and changing family forms. Even when current 
parentage laws can be used to legalize nontraditional parent-child relation-
ships, courts are often reluctant to do so, in large part because they are re-
* Associate Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. I 
would like to thank the students of the NIU Law Review for organizing this symposium. 
1. E.g., Kristine Renee H. v. Lisa Ann R., 16 Cal. Ct. App. 3d 123 (2004) (lesbian 
couple agreed that one partner would be artificially inseminated but both would coparent; 
the biological mother later sought a court judgment that the non-biological mother had no 
legal parent child relationship); KM. v. E.G., 13 Cal. Ct. App. 3d 136 (2004), cert. granted, 
M.K v. E.G., 97 P.3d 72 (2004). KM. donated eggs and E.G. was the gestational mother; 
K.M. later sought to, and was denied, the right to establish legal parentage. Id. 
2. See, e.g., Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Repro-
duction and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597 (2002) (discuss-
ing and critiquing the application of traditional family law principles to nonmarital families). 
433 
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luctant to depart from the traditional family paradigm of one mother/one 
father? 
Parentage has long been established through biology or adoption.4 In 
the maternity context, motherhood has been ascribed, in a relatively 
straightforward manner, to the woman who gave birth to the child. Pater-
nity has traditionally been established through either biological connection 
or the marital presumption of paternity.5 The advent of reproductive tech-
nologies, however, has made these traditional means of establishing parent-
age inadequate for some situations. Moreover, paternity and divorce laws 
protect the rights of parents to maintain custodial and visitation relation-
ships with their children; in the absence of legal parentage, it is hard to 
overcome the presumptions of parental autonomy to establish a custody or 
visitation order.6 For nonlegaC lesbian coparents, the lack of biological or 
birth connection has often been an impediment to establishing a legal parent 
child relationship and thus an insurmountable obstacle in maintaining a 
custodial or visitation relationship with their child(ren).8 Therefore, courts 
have attempted to fashion additional means by which parentage can be es-
tablished. 
Scholars, and more recently courts, have started to embrace the notion 
of functional parenthood as an alternative means of establishing parent-
3. See, e.g., Ruthann Robson, Third Panies and the Third Sex: Child Custody and 
Lesbian Legal Theory, 26 CONN. L. REv. 1377, 1391-92 (1994). "The lesbian non-legal 
mother ... challenges the heterosexual matrix of third party custody by being the 'other' 
mother in an ideology that acknowledges only one mother, the third party in an ideology that 
admits of only two parents, one of each gender." ld. 
4. Julie Shapiro, De Facto Parents and the Unfulfilled Promise of the New ALI 
Principles, 35 WILLIAMETIEL. REV. 769,771 (1999). 
5. To preserve the extant, nuclear family, courts have long embraced the marital 
presumption of paternity, perhaps best illustrated in the case of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 
U.S. 110 (1989), in which the Supreme Court rejected the petition of a biological father to 
establish a custodial, hence legal, relationship with his daughter in favor of preserving the 
intact marital unit. See also, Theresa Glennon, Somebody's Child: Evaluating the Erosion of 
the Marital Presumption of Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 547 (2000) (providing a historical 
analysis of the marital presumption and critique of its ongoing utility). 
6. See Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger: Adju-
dicating Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REv. 341, 348-49 
(2002). 
7. By using the term "nonlegal" I wish to include both lesbian coparents who have 
no genetic nor birth connection to the child as well as those women who have donated eggs 
to their partner but under the traditional means of parentage establishment, are not the 
mother because they did not give birth to the child. In a previous writing, I referred only to 
"non-biological" lesbian coparents, but wish to expand the analysis in this article to include 
the second scenario just identified. See Jacobs, supra note 6. 
8. E.g., Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991). The court refused to 
enter a visitation order for a non-biological lesbian coparent because she could not prove 
biological or adoptive parenthood under statute. ld. 
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hood.9 Additionally, both the American Law Institute (AU) and the 2002 
revised version of the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) recognize that parental 
status and legal parenthood may be established without regard to biological 
connection.1O The general premise of functional parenthood is to recognize 
someone who has, in a meaningful and regular way, acted as a parent and 
held herself out as a parent to the child. I I In the past decade, several courts 
9. See generally Melanie B. Jacobs, When Daddy Doesn't Want to be Daddy Any-
more: An Argument Against Paternity Fraud Claims, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 193, 208-13 
(2004) (providing an overview of the growing recognition of functional parenthood doc-
trine). 
Scholars have been addressing the need for expanded definitions of parenthood 
(i.e., beyond biology) for two decades. In a seminal article in 1984, Katharine Bartlett ar-
gued that courts must look beyond the traditional exclusivity model of parentage, in light of 
the decline of the nuclear family. Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclu-
sive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has 
Failed, 70. VA. L. REV. 879 (1984). Nancy Polikoff has also argued that legal parenthood 
premised only upon biology leaves many children with nontraditional parents out in the cold. 
Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the 
Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 OEO. L.J. 459 
(1990). See also Janet Leach Richards, Redefining Parenthood: Parental Rights Versus 
Child Rights, 40 WAYNE L. REv. 1227 (1994) (recognizing the need to include non-
biological caretakers within the legal definition of parent based upon the best interests of the 
child). 
10. The ALI Principles include establishment of a legal parent child relationship 
without regard to genetic connection in a variety of circumstances. The ALI defines "par-
ent" as a legal parent, parent by estoppel, or a de facto parent. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF 
THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION § 2.03 (1) (Tentative 
Draft No.4, 2000) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES]. A parent by estoppel is defined, in part, as 
an individual who has either lived with the child since the child's birth or has lived with the 
child for at least two years, "holding out and accepting full and permanent responsibilities as 
a parent, as part of a prior co-parenting agreement with the child's legal parent," when the 
court finds that recognition as a parent is in the child's best interests. ALI PRINCIPLES § 
2.03(1)(b). A de facto parent is defined, in part, as someone "who regularly performed a 
share of caretaking functions at least as great as that of the parent with whom the child pri-
marily lived." ALI PRINCIPLES § 2.03(1)(c). 
Moreover, the UPA also includes presumptions of legal parenthood that are not 
predicated on biology. For example, the UPA presumes a man's legal fatherhood if "for the 
first two years of the child's life, he resided in the same household with the child and openly 
held out the child as his own." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(5) (amended 2002), 9B 
U.L.A. 311 (Supp. 2004). 
11. For example, stepparents, grandparents, and foster parents, have increasingly 
been recognized as functional parents entitled to maintain custodial or visitation relation-
ships with children they helped raise. See, e.g., Smith v. O.F.F.E.R., 431 U.S. 816 (1977) 
(Supreme Court recognizing liberty interest in foster families in preserving relationships 
with children in their care); Nunn v. Nunn, 791 N.E.2d 779 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing 
Indiana statute which permits de facto custodians to establish custodial and/or visitation 
rights; in this case, a stepfather); Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291 (Me. 2000) (finding 
where grandparents had functioned as children's parents for significant periods of time, 
visitation pursuant to state Grandparents Visitation Act was appropriate and constitutional). 
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have used functional parenthood principles and equitable doctrines to award 
visitation rights to a nonlegal lesbian coparent. 12 While these cases repre-
sent positive progress for nonlegal mothers and their children, the results 
are not fully satisfying. The courts have not applied functional parenthood 
to legalize the parent-child relationship. Rather, the courts have used func-
tional parenthood doctrine merely as a means of preserving a visitation rela-
tionship.13 
In response to these lesbian coparent cases in which the functional 
parenthood doctrine was applied only to preserve visitation but not to rec-
ognize a legal parent child relationship, I have previously advocated using 
the UP A as a preferred method by which nonlegal lesbian coparents may be 
adjudicated a legal parent. 14 More specifically, I argued that applying the 
principles of functional parenthood, a nonlegal mother could be adjudicated 
a legal mother under the UP A, thus providing her with full parental status. 
I argue that such application is consistent with the policies of the UP A. In 
1973, the UPA was promulgated to provide substantial legal equality for 
children born out of wedlock; 15 it was substantially revised in 2000, with 
additional modifications in 2002.16 Both the 1973 and 2002 versions of the 
UPA recognize that parentage may be established by something other than 
biology or adoption. For instance, under the UP A, the mother and child 
relationship is established either by the woman's having given birth to the 
child, adoption of the child by the woman, or an adjudication of the 
woman's maternity.17 
By recognizing that maternity may be established other than by birth 
or adoption, the Act opens the door to other methods of maternity adjudica-
tion. One method may be proof of genetic motherhood; 18 another may be 
12. E.g., E.N,O. v. L.M.N., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 
539 (N.J. 2000); In Re Custody ofH.S.H.-K., 533 N.W. 2d 419,421 (Wis. 1995). 
13. In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 436 (stating that an invocation of 
general equitable principles to preserve the rights of a lesbian coparent must be exercised in 
a manner that protects a biological parent's autonomy and constitutional rights). 
14. Jacobs, supra note 6. I specifically recommended maternity adjudication under 
the UPA as an alternative to same-sex second parent adoption. Id. at 353-54 (articulating the 
advantages of adjudication under the UP A over an adoption proceeding with its potential 
time delay, expense, and adversarial nature). 
15. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, Prefatory Note (1973) (amended 2002), 9B u.L.A. 296. 
16. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. (amended 2002). 
17. Id. § 201(a). 
18. Through gender-neutral application of the Act, courts look to provisions appli-
cable to paternity establishment for maternity establishment. E.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 
P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (discussed below). Section 505 of the UPA provides that "a man is 
rebuttably identified as the father of a child if the genetic testing ... results disclose that ... 
the man has at least a 99 percent probability of paternity .... " UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 505 
(amended 2002). Thus, in cases like Johnson, the court was able to identify two potential 
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proof of functional parenthood, specifically holding oneself out as the 
child's parent. The UPA presumes a man to be the father of a child if, "for 
the first two years of the child's life, he resided in the same household with 
the child and openly held out the child as his own."l9 By analogy, then, a 
woman who resides with the child, functions as a mother, and holds herself 
out as a mother to the children, should be able to establish maternity under 
the Act. Using the UPA to establish maternity, the nonlegal lesbian copar-
ent becomes a legal parent with all the rights and responsibilities of parent-
hood?O No longer is she merely a third party attempting to maintain a visi-
tation relationship with her child; rather, she is a legal parent whose inter-
ests will be evaluated in a traditional parental framework and entitled to the 
benefits and protections accorded other legal parents in the context of cus-
tody and visitation?l As courts attempt to recognize means of establishing 
parentage other than through biology and adoption, several have embraced 
the concept of intent-based parenthood, meaning that the party who in-
tended to bring about the birth of the child should be declared the legal par-
ent.22 As Professor Richard Storrow has observed, however, parenthood by 
intention has been largely used to resolve parentage issues that arise in as-
sisted reproduction cases involving married couples?3 He argues that inten-
tional parenthood should be recognized as an alternative means of establish-
ing parentage-like genetic, gestational, or marital presumption parent-
hood-and should not be reserved for use only in cases involving married 
couples.24 I agree with Professor Storrow that parenthood by intention 
should not be reserved for married couples only and should be applied to 
nonlegal lesbian coparents, too. To date, however, courts have demon-
strated greater reluctance to use intention to establish legal parentage for 
nonlegal lesbian coparents. 
A second difficulty of the intent doctrine as currently applied is that it 
focuses purely on pre-birth parenting intention; it does not encompass the 
intent to parent that may accompany functional parenting that begins after 
the child's birth. Thus, when courts are required to make initial parentage 
determinations among multiple potential parents, intent is often useful to 
choose between them. When only two parties are involved, however, intent 
mothers under the Act: the birth mother and the genetic mother. See infra notes 26-36 and 
accompanying text. 
19. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(5) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 311 (Supp. 
2002). 
20. For a brief discussion of the many rights and responsibilities that attach to legal 
parenthood, see Jacobs, supra note 6, at 347-48. 
21. ld.at351. 
22. See infra Part A. 
23. See Storrow, supra note 2, at 639-40. 
24. Id. at 677-78. 
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should be considered either to establish parentage in the first instance, or 
later, as a component of a functional parenthood analysis. If the parties did 
not intend to coparent pre-birth, but actively coparented the child for a pe-
riod of time thereafter, I suggest that the initial intent should not be used to 
preclude parentage determination and the current intent to coparent should 
be considered as an element of functional parenthood?5 
Finally, while intention is a good alternative to parental determinations 
predicated on biology or the marital presumption, the intent principle 
should not preclude other methods of parental establishment. As discussed 
below, some courts are concluding that if initial intent to parent is not pre-
sent, functional parenthood is irrelevant. Analysis of the two leading cases 
in which the intent principle has been developed demonstrates some of its 
current limitations. 
A. INTENT-BASED PARENTHOOD 
The leading case to embrace intent-based parentage is that of Johnson 
v. Calvert.26 Mark and Crispina Calvert had contracted with Anna Johnson 
to serve as a gestational surrogate for them. 27 Although Crispina had had a 
hysterectomy and could not gestate a pregnancy, she was able to produce 
eggs and Anna became the gestational surrogate for an embryo created 
from Mark's sperm and Crispina's egg.28 During the pregnancy, Anna be-
came reluctant to give the child to the Cal verts and ultimately sought to 
establish her maternity and keep the baby?9 The Court was required to 
determine who was the legal mother under California's version of the UPA: 
the birth mother or the genetic mother? 
Under the California parentage statute, any interested party may bring 
an action to determine the existence of the mother and child relationship.3o 
The mother and child relationshi~ may be established by proof of her hav-
ing given birth or under the Act. I As with the UPA, California's version 
includes language that states that insofar as practicable, provisions applica-
ble to the father and child relationship may be applied to the mother and 
child relationship.32 One of the means by which paternity can be estab-
25. I have argued elsewhere that functioning as a parent demonstrates "intent to 
parent" even if the person did not intend to bring about the birth of the child. See Jacobs, 
supra note 9. 
26. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). 
27. Id. at 778. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 780 (citing CAL. CIv. CODE § 7015 (West 1997)). 
31. Id. 
32. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 780. "[T]he Act sets forth no specific means by which a 
natural mother can establish a parent and child relationship. However, ... insofar as practi-
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lished is through evidence derived from genetic testing; another way is 
through application of the presumption of paternity based on a man's con-
duct toward the child, such as receiving the child into his home and openly 
holding the child out as his own.33 Because genetic testing excluded Anna 
as the baby's mother and confirmed that Crispina was, in fact, the genetic 
mother, both women qualified as "mother" under the Act.34 
In this case, three people were asserting parental rights: Mark, 
Crispina, and Anna. The court noted, however, that it was impossible to 
declare two legal mothers.35 In order to establish one woman as the legal 
mother, the court looked to the parties' intent prior to the pregnancy and 
used intent as the "tie-breaker." Specifically, the court explained that when 
the two means to prove "natural" motherhood under the Act do not coincide 
in one woman, "she who intended to procreate the child-that is, she who 
intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her 
own-is the natural mother under California law.,,36 
Thus, intent was not used as the sole means of establishing maternity; 
rather, as between two competing options, the court used intent as a tie-
breaker to choose one mother. Notably, the court was choosing between 
two mothers so as not to create three legal parents; in essence, it was choos-
ing between two women for the same parental role. Some scholars have 
argued that if the court had been confronted with a situation in which only 
one woman was seeking legal recognition of parentage-as a second, rather 
than third, parent-the court's intent analysis could apply in such a sce-
nario?? 
cable, provisions applicable to the father and child relationship apply in an action to deter-
mine the existence or nonexistence of a mother and child relationship." Id. at 781 n.8. 
33. Id. (citing CAL. Civ. CODE § 7004 (West 1997». See also UNIF. PARENTAGE 
ACT § 204(a)(5). 
34. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 781. 
35. Id. "Yet for any child California law recognizes only one natural mother .... " 
Id. The court further declined to "find the child has two mothers .... To recognize parental 
rights in a third party with whom the Calvert family has had little contact since shortly after 
the child's birth would diminish Crispina's role as mother." Id. at fn.8. 
36. Id. at 781. 
37. See, e.g., Shannon Minter and Kate Kendell, Beyond Second-Parent Adoption: 
The Uniform Parentage Act and the "Intended Parents" - A Model Brief, 29 GEO. J. GENDER 
& L. 29, 32 (2000). The authors argue that courts should employ the UPA to establish legal 
parentage for nonlegal lesbian coparents. They further contend that applying this intent-
based standard is consistent with the holding in Johnson, that the terms of the UP A must be 
applied in a gender-neutral manner so that the standards used to determine the parentage of a 
child born to a different sex couple through assisted reproduction is similarly applied to 
determine the parentage of a child born to a same-sex couple through assisted reproduction. 
Id. See also Emily Doskow, The Second-Parent Trap: Parenting for Same-Sex Couples in a 
Brave New World, 201. Jvv. L. I, 18 (1999) (the author notes that the court left open the 
possibility that recognition of two mothers could be appropriate particularly because of the 
court's emphasis on intentions). 
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Several years later, a California court was again confronted with a dif-
ficult parentage case involving reproductive technology. In Buzzanca, five 
people were responsible for the birth of the child, and the court needed to 
determine the legal parents.38 Luanne and John agreed to have an embryo 
genetically unrelated to either of them implanted in a surrogate?9 After the 
pregnancy, John filed for divorce and a trial court was presented with the 
question of who are Jaycee's, the baby's, legal parents. The trial court 
"reached an extraordinary conclusion: Jaycee had no lawful parents.'.40 The 
trial court reached this conclusion, in part, because the surrogate and her 
husband had agreed in writing that they were not the lawful parents, and the 
trial court further concluded that neither Luanne nor John were legal par-
ents because they lacked any biological connection to Jaycee.41 
The appellate disagreed and in beginning its analysis, clarified that le-
gal motherhood could be established other than by giving birth or contribut-
ing an egg.42 Analogizing to paternity law, the court recognized that fa-
therhood can be established by conduct, such as permitting a spouse to be 
artificially inseminated.43 The court stated that parity of reasoning leads to 
the conclusion that both a husband and wife should be deemed lawful par-
ents after a surrogate bears a biologically unrelated child.44 Specifically, 
the court noted that Luanne's consent to the surrogacy situated her like a 
husband in an artificial insemination case and thus enabled her to establish 
maternity "under this part" because of her consent.45 
Just as the Johnson court had to determine maternity under the Act and 
used intent as a tie-breaker, Buzzanca took intent a step farther and used 
pure intention to establish Luanne's parentage under the Act.46 Because 
Luanne "caused" Jaycee's conception and birth by initiating the surrogacy 
arrangement, she intended the birth, intended to parent, and thus should 
have been declared the legal mother.47 The court further noted that inten-
tion should also be used to establish John's paternity.48 
I offer two observations concerning application of the intent-based 
standard as currently developed in Johnson and Buzzanca. First, intention 
has been employed when courts are confronted with determining legal par-
entage soon after the birth of a child and before a party has invested signifi-
38. Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
39. [d. at 282. 
40. [d. 
41. /d. 
42. [d. 
43. [d. 
44. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 282. 
45. [d. at 288. 
46. [d. 
47. [d. at 291. 
48. /d. 
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cant time functioning as a parent. Its utility, then, seems best applied when 
courts are making an initial determination of who should have the right to 
parent, before significant parenting is undertaken. By contrast, functional 
parenthood doctrine serves as a means of establishing legal parentage after 
someone has already assumed the responsibilities of parenthood and wishes 
to legalize the parent child relationship. Initial intent to parent often leads 
to functional parenthood, but there may be instances in which someone 
meets the criteria of a functional parent but did not intend to "bring about 
the birth of the child.'049 
Second, intent has served as a tie-breaker between two individuals 
seeking the same parental role. That is, in Johnson, two women were seek-
ing to establish maternity within a two-parent paradigm and paternity had 
already been established.50 Intent was used as a tie-breaker to choose one 
mother because the court was constrained to remain within the two-parent 
framework and did not wish to award legal parental status to three people. 
The Johnson court did not specifically restrict its analysis to this situation; 
although, as the discussion below demonstrates, many courts have viewed 
the doctrine in a restrictive manner. Intent should not be used as a means of 
precluding courts from making parental determinations when only two in-
dividuals seek parental status.51 In the nonlegal lesbian coparent cases, 
courts are not being asked to choose one woman as the "natural mother," 
but rather to recognize two mothers as the only two legal parents. In this 
way, courts are not being asked to modify the one mother/one father para-
digm to recognize a new paradigm of two mothers/one father. 
B. APPLYING INTENT TO NONLEGAL LESBIAN COPARENTS 
How then should courts use the intent test when making parentage de-
terminations for lesbian coparents? In K.M. v. E.G. ,52 the court concluded 
that because K.M. had donated her eggs to E.G. without the intent of being 
a parent upon the children's birth, the intent doctrine precluded any subse-
quent determination of parentage, despite K.M.' s several years of active 
parenting. K.M. and E.G. entered into a committed, intimate relationship in 
49. Certainly, the intent doctrine could be expanded to apply to nonlegal lesbian 
coparents who seek a determination of parentage at birth, but the doctrine in its current ap-
plication should not preclude other means of parentage establishment. 
50. 851 P.2d at 776. 
51. Whether courts should confer legal parental status on more than two individuals 
is beyond the scope of this article. There may, in fact, be appropriate instances in which to 
recognize the legal rights of more than two individuals. In this article, I have limited my 
argument and merely advocate that intent should not be used to preclude an alternative rep-
resentation of the two-parent paradigm. 
52. 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 136. 
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1993.53 E.G. had considered artificial insemination prior to beginning the 
relationship and K.M. knew of E.G.'s plans to have a baby.54 The parties, 
in fact, agreed that it was E.G.'s intention to have a child alone.55 E.G. had 
difficulty with the insemination process, and it was determined that she was 
unable to produce enough eggs.56 Ultimately, the parties agreed that K.M. 
would donate her eggs, that E.G. would be the sole legal parent, and that 
E.G. would consider adoption by K.M. after a period of five years.57 
E.G. gave birth to twins in December 1995 and the couple soon after 
"married.,,58 While only E.G. was listed on the children's birth certificates 
and provided health insurance for the children, it was undisputed that E.G., 
K.M., and the twins lived together as a family unit for the next five years.59 
Although K.M. actively coparented the children, she did not reveal to any-
one, including her own family, that she was the children's genetic mother 
until her relationship with E.G. ended.60 K.M. sought to establish her legal 
parentage when the parties' relationship ended, but the trial court found that 
she had relinquished her claims to parentage when she had signed an ovum 
donor form. 61 
The appellate court upheld the trial court's findings and determined 
that K.M. was not a legal parent, in large part, because of her intentions to 
waive her parental rights when she donated her eggs.62 The court engaged 
in lengthy analysis of the UPA and Johnson test to conclude that only one 
mother can be declared under the UPA, and that they were required to make 
parentage determinations between two competing claimants.63 Rather than 
analyze this case in a two-parent paradigm, the court instead determined 
that because the gestational mother intended to parent the children, no other 
woman could be declared the "natural mother.,,64 The court noted that the 
Johnson test requires examination of the woman's intent '''from the outset' 
to bring about the birth of the child.,,65 Moreover, the court stated that 
when two women have proof of maternity, the determination of legal par-
entage is made by examining the parties' intentions and that as between the 
53. Id. at 139. 
54. Id. at 139-40. 
55. Id. at 140. 
56. Id. 
57. K.M., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 140. 
58. Id. at 141. 
59. Id. at 141. 
60. Id. at 142. 
61. Id. at 143. 
62. [d. at 149-50, 153-54. 
63. K.M., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 151-52 n.12. "[W]e must make the purely legal de-
termination as between the two claimants." [d. (quoting Johnson, 851 P.2d at 791). 
64. See id. at 152. 
65. K.M., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 151 (quoting Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782). 
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genetic and birth mothers, "the law recognizes the woman who intended to 
bring about the birth of the child to raise as her own.,,66 
The court did not look beyond K.M.' s initial intentions nor consider 
her years of functional parenting. Rather, it used a restrictive application of 
intention as a way of reinforcing E.G.'s legal motherhood and precluding 
any parentage determination for K.M. K.M. argued that her conduct subse-
quent to the birth of the twins mandated legal recognition of her parental 
status.6? The court rejected her argument and found that "[fJunctioning as a 
parent does not bestow legal status as a parent.,,68 The court approached 
intent and functionality backwards: the court saw functional parenthood as 
relevant to prove or refute intentional parenthood, instead of recognizing 
intention as a part of the functional parenthood analysis.69 
I contend that the K.M. court misapplied the Johnson test in two re-
spects. First, the court narrowed its analysis to determine only one legal 
mother and did not appreciate that K.M. sought a declaration of legal par-
entage as a second parent, not as the only legal mother. Second, the court 
used intention as a means of precluding a determination of legal parentage, 
rather than as a method of establishing parentage for a second parent. Re-
garding the first point, K.M. was not seeking a declaration of motherhood 
in place of E.G., in contrast to the facts of Johnson. Rather, K.M. sought 
reco§nition of her parental status as a second mother or a second legal par-
ent.? She was not competing with E.G. for the position of "natural mother" 
under the UPA as were Crispina and Anna; she merely sought legal recog-
nition of her five years of functional parenting.?1 
Relatedly, because she was not seeking to replace E.G. as the chil-
dren's mother, but was seeking to be declared a mother, the intention test 
was misapplied to preclude a functional parenthood analysis. The Johnson 
and Buzzanca courts used intention to make an initial parentage determina-
66. Id. at 151 (citing Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782). 
67. Id. at 136. 
68. Id. at 152. 
69. K.M., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at n. 13. 
We do not mean to imply that the conduct of the parties after the birth of 
a child and the parental roles the parties played have no legal signifi-
cance. Such evidence would be relevant to confirm or refute proof of 
the parties' parentage intentions at conception under the Johnson test. 
Id. Furthermore, the court relied on previous California lesbian coparent cases, particularly 
Nancy S. v. Michele G., in which a court refused to recognize the parental status of a non-
biological lesbian coparent. Id. (citing 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that 
non-biological lesbian coparent could not establish legal parentage under the California 
parentage act using theories of de facto parent or parent by estoppel and thus had no standing 
to pursue visitation or custody)). For an analysis of the Nancy S. opinion, see Jacobs, supra 
note 6, at Part III.B.I. 
70. K.M., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 141. 
71. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 776. 
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tion, to decide who had the right to function as the children's parents. In 
contrast, K.M. had functioned as a parent for more than five years.72 
Clearly, she had "intent" to parent over that period, even if she did not 
manifest that intent prior to the twins' births. Her decision to relinquish her 
parental rights almost six years prior to this litigation when she donated her 
eggs should not have precluded other parentage analyses, especially be-
cause, with E.G.'s consent and permission, she actively coparented the 
children.73 
The Johnson test was misapplied again in Maria B. v. Emily B.74 Elisa 
(Elisa Maria) and Emily were in a committed relationship and wished to 
have children.75 Both women wanted to experience childbirth, so each un-
derwent the artificial insemination process using an anonymous donor.76 
Elisa gave birth to a boy in 1997 and Emily gave birth to twins in 1998.77 
The women jointly chose the children's names and gave them hyphenated 
surnames, breastfed the children together, and each woman considered her-
self mother to the other's child(ren).78 In fact, since Elisa earned a higher 
salary, they agreed that Emily would remain a stay at home mom; Elisa 
supported the family, paid medical insurance for the children, and claimed 
the children as dependents on her taxes.79 
The relationship soured and the couple separated in 1999.80 Although 
initially Elisa supported Emily and the twins, she ceased doing so in May 
2001, and one month later, the county filed a complaint against Elisa to 
establish her parentage and a child support order.8l The trial court held that 
because Elisa intended to create children with Emily, and because she had 
functioned as a de facto parent, she should be declared a legal parent under 
the UP A. 82 The appellate court disagreed and determined that Elisa had no 
parental status with the children, and thus no parental obligation.83 Quoting 
the Johnson opinion, the Elisa B. court stated that "California law recog-
72. K.M., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 141. 
73. Id. at 140-41. 
74. 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
75. Id. at 497. 
76. Id. at 498. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Maria B., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 498. Although the women had consulted with an 
attorney prior to the children's births concerning adoption, they did not follow through. Id. 
80. Id. at 498. 
81. Id. Elisa contended that under the UP A, she was not a legal parent and there-
fore had no duty to support the children.ld. at 499. 
82. Id. Using parity of reasoning, much like the Buzzanca court, the trial court held 
Elisa to the same legal responsibilities as a man under the UP A. I contend that the trial court 
correctly found Elisa to be a parent under the UPA and appropriately considered her years of 
parenting as well as her intent to parent the twins. 
83. Id. at 508. 
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nizes only one mother" and further, that in making a determination of ma-
ternity, the law should recognize the woman who intended to bring about 
the birth of the child.84 Because Emily is biologically related to the twins 
and intended their births, the court concluded that she alone is their legal 
mother and Elisa has no legal relationship with the children.85 
The court used a myopic view of Johnson to reach this absurd result. 
Despite Elisa's intent to have the children and raise them as her own, cou-
pled with several years of active parenting, the court restricted its applica-
tion of the intent doctrine to determine which woman is the "natural 
mother" under the Act.86 The court did not need to be so restrictive in this 
case. Both women intended to bring about the births of all three children; 
yet, the court relied on intent as a tie-breaker and did not see the greater 
applicability of using Elisa's intent and functional parenthood to establish 
her legal relationship (and responsibilities). 
The county, on behalf of Emily, was not asking that Elisa be declared 
mother in place of Emily, but rather that her parenthood be established in 
addition to Emily's.87 Just as in a paternity case, the court was requested to 
legalize a second parental relationship with the child; here Elisa could eas-
ily have been found a parent under the UPA if the court applied the pater-
nity presumption of holding oneself out as a parent and considered her in-
tent to parent. As discussed above, the Johnson court used intent as a tie-
breaker between two individuals seeking to fill the same parental role; that 
was not the issue presented here, and the Johnson court did not specifically 
limit application of intent to that context. 
The Maria B. court similarly applied a narrow reading of Buzzanca, 
stating that the Buzzanca ruling was limited to its facts and that the court 
did not address whether its reasoning would apply to an unmarried or same-
sex couple.88 Thus, the court determined that relying on Buzzanca's estab-
lishment of Luanne's parentage by pure intention was not applicable here. 
In addition, the court wrote, "[n]othing in Buzzanca or Johnson holds that a 
woman's intention to create and raise a child can be used to establish the 
child has two mothers.,,89 Thus, the court concluded, Elisa's intent is ir-
relevant to her parentage determination. As Professor Storrow observed, 
parenthood by intention has been reserved for married couples and this case 
lends credence to his observation. There is no appreciable difference be-
84. Id. 
85. Maria B., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 500. 
86. Id. at 502. "Here, the twins have a natural, biological mother Emily, who is not 
disclaiming her maternal rights and obligations, and the children can have only one natural 
mother." Id. 
87. Id. at 498. 
88. Id. at 503. 
89. Id. at 504. 
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tween Luanne and Elisa: both women intended to parent children with 
whom they would have no biological connection. "But for" their intent, the 
children may not have been born. Yet, the court refused to look beyond the 
traditional one mother/one father paradigm. 
A third California appellate court confronted with the issue of deter-
mining parentage for a nonlegal lesbian coparent concluded that the UPA 
could be applied to establish her parentage and used the Johnson intent test 
to reinforce its decision. In Kristine H. v. Lisa R. ,90 the women, who had 
been in a long-term relationship, jointly agreed that one partner would be 
artificially inseminated.91 A month before their daughter's birth, they ob-
tained a pre-birth judgment based on a joint stipulation in which they de-
clared their intention to be joint legal parents.9 Following her birth, the 
women raised her together for about two years before they separated.93 At 
that time, Kristine, the biological and birth mother, brought an action to 
vacate the judgment and have Lisa's parental rights voided.94 
The court defined two legal issues: was the pre-birth judgment en-
forceable? And, if not, could Lisa establish parentage under California's 
UP A ?95 First, the court addressed the legality of the judgment. The parties 
filed their stipulation and sought a pre-birth judgment based on Johnson 
and Buzzanca, indicating that they both intended to parent the child.96 De-
spite the parties' intentions, the appellate court found the judgment was 
void and not authorized under the UPA.97 The court engaged in a thorough 
analysis of both Johnson and Buzzanca and reasoned that "[i]n those cases 
the court looked at the parties' intent as a part of the interpretation and ap-
plication of the Act. Only when the Act was unclear or yielded an ambigu-
ous result did the courts consider intent to determine parentage.,,98 The 
court further concluded that neither Johnson nor Buzzanca permit contrac-
tual stipulations of parentage based on the parties' intentions alone.99 Ques-
90. 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
91. [d. at 125. 
92. [d. at 125. 
93. [d. 
94. [d. 
95. [d. 
96. Kristine H., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 128. 
97. [d. at 131. 
98. [d. at 133-34. 
99. [d. at 133. The court took notice that based on the intended-parent doctrine 
articulated in the cases, courts in several counties had granted pre-birth judgments. [d. at 132 
n.17. This was apparently the first appellate challenge to the practice and it was resound-
ingly rejected by this court. [d. at 132. The court did not address the scenario of women 
obtaining a judgment post-birth, as many opposite-sex couples do in the paternity context. 
Given the court's gender-neutral application of other provisions of the UPA, it would be 
inapposite for the court not to recognize a post-birth judgment. 
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tioning the applicability of the UPA generally to determinations of parent-
age for nonlegal lesbian coparents, the court determined the Act should 
apply and explicitly rejected the reasoning espoused in Maria B.100 By par-
ity of reasoning and gender-neutral application of the provision related to 
establishment of the father and child relationship, the court declared its abil-
ity to establish a mother and child relationship. 101 Reviewing cases like 
Johnson, in which the court similarly used portions of the Act to establish 
maternity, the court noted that while previous cases had not specifically 
addressed the possibility of establishing legal parentage in a parent of the 
same sex, there is nothing in the statutory language which precludes such a 
result. 102 
The Kristine court further rejected arguments that the Johnson ruling 
precluded the establishment of a legal relationship for a second mother. 103 
The court recognized that the Johnson language regarding the legal recogni-
tion of one mother only was contextual104 and agreed that the Johnson court 
did not foreclose the possibility of finding two parents of the same sex as 
the child's legal parents where only two were attempting to establish legal 
parentage. 105 Thus, by applying the Act in a gender-neutral manner, the 
court looked to the provision of the Act that presumes paternity if a man 
receives a child into his home and openly holds the child out as his own.106 
While acknowledging that no other appellate division has applied section 
7611(d) to determine parental rights for a same-sex partner, the court re-
jected the reasoning of other opinions and concluded that, indeed, the pre-
sumption could apply. Moreover, based on the factual history of the case, 
the court easily found that Lisa met the standard of the presumption. 
Finally, the court noted that while parentage must be established under 
the Act, the intended parent doctrine reinforced its result. The court ob-
served that the women "acted together to cause the birth of their child.,,107 
The court determined that a finding that Lisa is also the child's mother is 
consistent with the women's intentions prior to the birth of their daughter 
and just as other parents must deal with the consequences of legal separa-
100. Kristine H., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 126. 
10 I. Jd. at 134. 
102. Jd. at 13S. "The Act contemplates two legal parents irrespective of their gen-
der." Jd. 
103. Jd. at 136. 
104. Kristine H., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 136. Referring to the Johnson court's statement 
that "California law recognizes only one legal mother," the court noted that the comment 
was made in the context of two competing claims for motherhood and, further, that the court 
was reluctant to imbue a third party with parental rights. Jd. (quoting Johnson, 8S1 P.2d at 
781). 
lOS. 
106. 
107. 
Jd. 
Jd. at 138 (citing § 761 I (d». 
Jd. at 14S (emphasis in original). 
HeinOnline -- 25 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 448 2004-2005
448 NORTHERN ILUNOIS UNIVERSITY fA IV REVIEW [Vol. 25 
tion, so too must these. 108 Intent was not the sole factor in establishing 
Lisa's parentage, but it assisted the court in making its determination. 
Here, the court used intent as an element of the parentage decision. 
Although rejecting parenthood by pure intention, vacating the judgment, the 
court understood that intent is often part of the function and considered 
intent in application of the Act. Moreover, the court did not use intent as a 
means of precluding other determinations and did not severely restrict the 
application of the Johnson and Buzzanca decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
Parenthood by intention should be used as a means of establishing le-
gal parentage for nonlegal lesbian coparents. It should either be used as a 
way to legalize the parental relationship immediately after the birth of a 
child or as part of a greater functional parenthood application. The inten-
tion doctrine should not continue to be narrowly applied; rather, courts 
should follow the example set by the Kristine court and recognize that the 
Johnson opinion did not restrict intention to' married couples and tie-
breaking scenarios. Interestingly, all three nonlegal lesbian coparent cases 
have been accepted for review by the California Supreme Court, which will 
hopefully broaden the scope and application of the intent doctrine and pro-
vide another avenue for parental recognition for lesbian coparents. 
108. Id. at 146. 
